What sparked the Northern African 2011 Revolutions and how did they affect the current politics in the region?
What Caused the Northern African 2011 Revolutions?
The 2011 Northern African Revolutions (popularly known as the Arab spring) was triggered by the democratic aspirations of people in this region, in addition to economic hardships (Stepan & Linz 2013). According to Desai et al. (2011), the issue hinges on widespread poverty, imbalances in income, nepotism, corruption, and lack of governance. Mirkin (2013) opines that high rates of unemployment in Tunis and Egypt, and more so amongst the youth, resulted in insurgencies in these countries. A report by the IMF World Outlook Database (2013) reveals that prior to the Arab spring Egypt had an unemployment rate of nearly 9%. However, following the unrest, unemployment increased to more than 12%. In contrast, Libya saw its unemployment rate increase to more than 25%, although the 2008 global financial crisis also contributed to this rise in unemployment (IMF 2013). This means that for every four people in Libya, one of them is unemployed. Consequently, unemployment played a key role in triggering the insurgencies in Libya.
Prior to the unrest, Tunisia had an unemployment rate of 13%, but it quickly rose to 19% by 2012 (IMF 2013). The highest level of unemployment was recorded amongst the youth (between 18 and 29 years), and this acted as the key reason for the revolution (IFAD 2011). Prior to the revolution, youth unemployment in Tunisia was estimated at 30% (IFAD 2011). The 2006 census in Egypt showed that 40% of the country's population was aged between 10 and 29 years. While this should have been regarded as a “democratic gift” for the country, insufficient unemployment turned it into a “democratic burden”. In 2009, Egypt recorded an unemployment rate of 16% amongst its youths of between 15 and 29 years (IDSC 2010). According to CAPMAS (2012), this dire situation augmented negative feelings among young people regarding their future. Consequently, this provoked resistance and disobedience against their respective governments. By 2012, the level of unemployment among this age group had increased to 41.4% (CAPMAS 2012). Countries like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia tend to be comparatively poor in as far as natural resources are concerned. These countries witnessed a significant rise in energy and food prices in 2010, meaning that they ended up losing considerable income owing to the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (Moaddel 2012).
It is also important to take into account the fact that countries ought to balance their income distribution. While such countries as Libya and Algeria are endowed with natural resources, a huge part of their populations do not benefit form the income realised from the sale of these resources. Corruption and nepotism means that only a handful of those sharing a close relationship with government officials get to share this wealth (Salt 2012). This is a clear testament of the curse of natural resources at play, meaning that majority of the countries rich in natural resource are also characterised by high levels of poverty, unemployment, poor health and education level amongst the largest part of the population. On account of the imbalances in income distribution, continued shortcomings in health services, infrastructure, and education, negative feelings against the ruling regime (especially amongst the youths who were most oppressed), were bound to grow.
How the Northern African Revolution Spread
The first protests broke out in Tunisia, after Wikileaks had implicated the ruling elite in the country in corruption. However, what really catalysed the revolution in Tunisia was self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi, after he was denied a permit to sell fruits and vegetables in the streets. Bouazizi has resorted to fruit vending owing to the high rate of unemployment in Tunisia (Beck & Hüser, 2012). The revolution quickly spread to other MENA countries via cell phones, the internet, and satellite TVs (Dobra 2012), in what can only be described as a domino effect.
Considering that the countries in the region are characterised by varying political and socio-economic structures, development and outcomes of the protests also differed. On 28th December, 2010, the riots spread to Algeria and two weeks later to Jordan. By 18th January, the protests had spread to Yemen, then into Egypt, Morocco, and Libya within a month (The Guardian 2011).
Political implications of the revolutions
It is important to note that the 2011 uprisings in Northern Africa took place in certain states and not others. A volatile blend of entrenched political grievances and socio-economic problems typified all the uprisings held in the different countries. In this case, relative deprivation, coupled with contrast between reality and expectations was influential in the spread of the revolutions. Tunisia was the most affected country in the region. Here, unemployment had remained persistently high, particularly among the educated Tunisian youths. There were also considerable internal social and regional inequalities, widespread corruption, while the increase in food prices and the effect of the 2008 global financial crisis all combined to trigger the unrest (EIU 2011).
As the unrest spread across Northern Africa and the MENA region, there also emerged strong popular movements in such countries as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. In these countries, the governments were perceived as lacking legitimacy. A wind of change was blowing over this region and was bound to transform its political structure (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013).
Perrin (2013) opines that the political unrest in Tunisia can be attributed to food-price inflation, political corruption, high unemployment, and suppression of political and civil liberties such as freedom of speech. The unrest culminated in the coming to an end of the President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime on 14th January 2011. He had been in power for 23 years. This new development led to the abolishing of his political party. The Muslim Brotherhood formed a political party known as Annahda which went on to win the October 2011 election (EIU 2011). On the other hand, one cannot claim with certainty that the post-revolution era has been a success. For example, Moaddel (2012) claims that even after the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power in Tunisia, the government has not made considerable inroad on economic and social grounds.
Egyptians, inspired by the toppling of Ben Ali, took to the streets in opposition to the authoritarian rule of President Mubarak. The state of emergency law was an exemplification of President Mubarak's regime. This rule presumably warranted police brutality, in addition to suppressing political and civil liberties. The unrest started on 25th January 2011 saw Hosni Mubarak era as president, who has ruled the country with an iron grip fro three decades, come to a drastic end. On 19th March 2011, the country held a referendum seeking to implement a new Constitution and on 28th November 2011, parliamentary elections were held. Between 16th and 17th June 2012, Egyptian went to the polls again for the presidential elections where Mohammad Morse won after garnering 51.73% of the votes cast. Despite the change of guard, the new government failed to improve the country’s economic growth rates, and neither could it attract FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). Consequently, the government could not stabilise markets. More importantly, the Morsi-led Government failed to take the necessary steps to enhance social justice and deal with youth unemployment. This triggered to restart of anti-government protests which began on 30th June 2013 and culminated in a coup d’état which led to the ousting of the Morsi government (Moaddel 2012).
Colonel Qaddafi tried to obliterate the revolutionary spark to avoid it enveloping his four decade-long rule by labelling his political opponents as sharing ties with the al-Qaeda. NATO spearheaded the popular protests that began on 17th February 2011 and lasted for 7 months, culminating in the killing of Colonel Qaddaffi. Following his killing, the National Transition Council was created. It was charged with running the government as the country prepared to go hold democratic elections which took place on 7th July 2012. Nevertheless, Libya is still characterised by inter-tribe conflicts while the country's unity is at stake.
The unrests led to the toppling of anti-democratic governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, while the masses in nations such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia Bahrain and Oman received social and economic rights due to the protests (Stepan & Linz 2013).
In order to come to terms with the impact of the North African revolution of 2011, we must also anticipate the emerging new order in the region. At the height of the revolution, during which time unshakable dictators from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt were toppled, it was widely anticipated that the region would undergo a political change that would usher in democracy. The removal of oppressive regimes was thus widely viewed as heralding the emergence of a new dawn of democratic leadership. Nonetheless, the transition government put in place lacked the strength needed to retain social and economic stability (Salt 2012). Even after having elected new governments, this has done little in the way of fulfilling the political aspirations of the revolution. Nonetheless, the revolution has had notable political implication on individual states where it happened.
In Egypt for example, the Mubarak regime was seen to back certain Israeli policies prior to the revolution, such as the blockade of Gaza. The government's stance on this policy among others created distance between the people and the regime. The new government has already started revising these policies. Additionally, the current leadership in Egypt has demonstrated enhanced openness towards Hamas for example, in comparison with the how the situation was during the Mubarak regime (Moaddel 2012). Moreover, the current regime is committed to provide economic and military aid to the Palestinians should the Israeli initiate military attacks in the Gaza Strip. Another difference between the Mubarak regime and the current regime is that Mubarak's government demonstrated a partial stance towards Fatah. On the other hand, the new regime government seems to have embraced a more balance stance regarding these two Palestinian factions. This was instrumental in its success in brokering reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.
On the other hand, although Libya witnessed a comparatively smooth political transformation after the killing of Colonel Qadaffi, redistribution of power is still seen to occur along conventional patrimonial lines as opposed to a move towards democratization. Consequently, several issues still remain unresolved, such as rebels vs. former regime members, Liberals vs. Islamists and more importantly, security issues that encompass organised crime, armed militias, and the potential threat of tribal clashes.
Conclusion
The 2011 Northern Africa Revolutions were a sequence of multiple but interconnected events. The common factors associated with the revolutions included corruption by government officials, unequal internal distribution of wealth in various regions, nepotism, increase in food prices, effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, and high level of unemployment, especially among the youths. Tunisia was the most affected state and it is not a wonder therefore that the protests were ignited here. Mass protests in Tunisia, Egypt resulted in the ousting of two of the longest serving dictators in the region. However, the uprisings only succeeded in partially ousting of the dictators. In Libya, the uprisings led to the overthrow of the ruling regime, bringing to an end four decades of Colonel Qadaffi's rule. Other parts of Northern Africa experienced limited turbulence, even as the monarchy in Morocco provided minimal reforms in a bid to forestall protracted political challenge. It may be too early to establish if the political wave borne out of the revolutions will lead to the realisation of democracy in the region. While the revolutions have clearly not brought about noteworthy social and economic reforms in the region, there have been a few notable changes in government political stance, such as the decision by the new government in Egypt to back Palestinians militarily and financially in case of an Israel attack on the Gaza Strip. This is unlike the Mubarak regime that was less open to the issue of Hamas and Fatah.
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